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Editorial AUGUST 2007
The Ethics of Monopoly and Monopsony Power
in Academic
Medical Centers
Frank A. Chervenak, MD; Laurence B. McCullough, PhD
Monopoly power is a familiar economic concept: a single
seller or a small group of sellers that dominates a market.
The seller gains the economic benefit of secure revenue
streams and increased profit, while shifting to buyers
the burden of the resulting higher costs. Monop-sony
power is a less familiar economic concept: a single buyer
or group of buyers dominates the market. This results
in a disparity of power that is the converse of monopoly,
butlike monopolythere is great potential
for exploitation when the power is abused.1 Monopsonies
exploit sellers by setting artificially low prices, not
ordering goods
or services, and not providing adequate informationall
of which injure the interests of sellers. As physicians,
we can see this principle at work in the managed care
setting.2
A teaching hospital can gain monopsony power over
a medical school, as when an OB/GYN
department has highly regarded voluntary faculty who
compete with full-time faculty, and with whom the hospital
has preferential arrangements. Because the medical
school needs the teaching hospital to support faculty,
provide clinical training for students, and conduct
research, it must respond to the teaching hospital’s
monopsony.
A particular service within an OB/GYN department
may gain monopoly power by creating financial and expertise
barriers to entry, as with an assisted-reproduction
medicine service. In settings where the medical school
controls hospital privileges it is the sole provider
of these services, gaining a monopoly over the hospital.
Thus, the medical school’s monopoly power is
considerable in closed-staff hospitals in contrast
to the weaker power of a medical school affiliated
with an open-staff hospital.
The ethical concept of cofidu-ciary responsibility
provides a basis for responsible management of such
power relationships in academic medical centers. This
concept comes to us from the British physician-ethicists
John Gregory (1724-1773) and Thomas Percival (1740-1804).
They identified three components of this ethical concept3:
- Physicians and hospitals should be scientifically and clinically competent, basing clinical practice and its continuous improvement on evidence-based medicine
- Physicians and hospitals should act primarily for the benefit of patients,
keeping
self-interestincluding economic interestssystematically secondary
- Medicine and hospitals are public trusts that should be managed for the long-term benefit of patients and society, not primarily for the self-interests of physicians and hospitalsincluding legitimate and even urgent economic interests.
In the clinical setting, Brody4 and Wear5 have argued
that clinical transparency obligates the physician
to provide clinically reliable information to the patient.
The transparency of the informed consent process in
which patients are provided information that they need
protects the patient from the potential for exploitation
that results from a disparity of power.
Transparency also legitimatizes monopoly and monopsony
power in academic medical centers. The leadership of
both the medical school and the teaching hospital should
routinely provide each other with information about
economic self-interests that are necessary for fulfilling
cofiduciary responsibility. For example, improving
the quality of patient care is a fundamental cofiduciary
responsibility that also costs money. Business plans
should clearly define the true costs of continuous
quality enhancement and revenues available to cover
them. To avoid exploitation of monopsony power of the
teaching hospital the assumption of costs by each party
should reflect the portion of the benefit claimed by
each party. The calculation of costs should be rigorous,
comprehensive, and honest. Otherwise, the teaching
hospital can exploit the medical school by shifting
costs to it thus impeding patient care, education,
and research. The medical school can exploit the teaching
hospital by demanding excessive reimbursements to cover
the costs of its own (sometimes inefficient) bureaucracies.
Failure to achieve transparency results in both parties Àgaming” the system by various means, such as strategic procrastination and strategic ambiguity,6 misdirection, and outright deception, which corrupt the organizational culture.7
It is important to distinguish the reality of transparency from its appearance. From a desire or need to protect monopoly or monopsony one or both parties could simulate transparency by publicly committing themselves to it but then not funding the requisite infrastructure (eg, committing to quality enhancement without paying for data collection, analysis, and dissemination; or requiring management accountability). The appearance of transparency may advance monopoly or monopsony power but should never be mistaken for transparency itself.
An ethical perspective on monopoly and monopsony power is essential for understanding the complex power relationships between medical schools and their teaching hospitals. Both institutions must strive to implement cofiduciary responsibility for excellence in patient care, medical education, and research.1 back to top
Frank A. Chervenak, MD, Editorial Advisory
Board Member.
Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, Professor of Medicine
and Medical Ethics
Center for Medical
Ethics and Health Policy
Baylor College of Medicine
Houston, TX.
References
- Chervenak FA, McCullough LB. Responsibly managing the medical school-teaching hospital relationship. Acad
Med. 2005;80(7):
690-693.
- Pauly MV. Managed care, market power, and monopsony. Health
Serv Res 1998;33(5 pt 2):1439-1460.
- McCullough LB. John Gregory (1724-1773) and the
Invention of Professional Medical Ethics and the Profession of Medicine. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic; 1998.
- Brody H. Transparency: informed consent in primary care. Hastings
Cent Rep. 1989;19(5):5-9.
- Wear S. Informed Consent: Patient Autonomy and
Physician Beneficence within Health Care. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; 2003.
- Chervenak FA, McCullough LB. Physicians and hospital managers as cofiduciaries of patients: rhetoric or reality? J
Healthc Manag. 2003;48(3):172-179.
- Chervenak FA, McCullough LB. The Diagnosis and management of progressive dysfunction of health care organizations. Obstet
Gynecol. 2005;105(4):882-887.
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